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AUTHOR FINAL VERSION – i.e. post-refereeing but before final editorial 
changes. The final published version of this text, with illustrations, will 
appear in Architectural Heritage 27 (December 2017). If quoting/citing, 





‘AN OBJECT LESSON IN HOW NOT TO GET THINGS DONE’: 
EDINBURGH’S UNBUILT ‘OPERA HOUSE’, 1960-1975 
 
This article examines the proposals of 1960–1975 for a major new theatre in central 
Edinburgh. Popularly known as the ‘opera house’, the proposed Castle Terrace 
Theatre (which was never built) was a regular fixture in the local press, with frequent 
reports of delays, funding crises, architectural debate, and concerns about the designs 
themselves. It is argued here that the real issue, however, was that, despite claims of 
an expansive cultural policy, central government funding for such major projects as 
the ‘opera house’ was less forthcoming than was the case for the many smaller 




In 1960, the Lyceum Theatre in Edinburgh’s West End was put up for sale.1 
After many years in the ownership of Howard and Wyndham, a firm which 
operated a circuit of touring theatres, it was purchased by a developer, Meyer 
Oppenheim of Argyle Securities. His proposals for the replacement of the 
theatre and the other buildings adjacent to the Usher Hall were published in 
                                                
1 National Records of Scotland (hereafter ‘NRS’), ED61/72, ‘Memorandum on the Edinburgh 
Lyceum Theatre/Castle Terrace project’, 18 November 1966. 
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1961.2 A new theatre would be screened by slab blocks containing a hotel and 
offices. The theatre, which was to be sold to Edinburgh Corporation and run 
as a civic venue, was to have 1700 seats, and mention was made of its use for 
grand opera. Oppenheim’s plan was endorsed by the city authorities in 1962, 
but collapsed in December 1963 amid rising costs.3 Nonetheless, the idea of a 
new theatre dedicated to large-scale operatic and dramatic productions did 
not go away. The Lord Provost, Sir Duncan Weatherstone, immediately 
expressed his support for such a project, and it was reconceived as a civic 
scheme, to be led and funded by Edinburgh Corporation as a key Festival 
venue. Its scale meant that claims were increasingly also made for its national 
significance, in part in recognition of Edinburgh’s ‘capital city’ status but also 
pragmatically, in the hope of securing central government funding. It would 
be a National Theatre for Scotland, a counterpart to the National Theatre then 
being designed for a site on London’s South Bank. The next twelve years saw 
a series of designs by two of Scotland’s most prominent architects, William 
Kininmonth and Robert Matthew.  
 
The ‘opera house’ (as the proposed Castle Terrace Theatre was typically 
described) was conceived during a period in which the landscape of theatre in 
Scotland and Britain changed significantly.4 Whereas professional theatre 
before 1939 had operated on an essentially commercial basis, the situation 
after 1945 was different. The Arts Council of Great Britain was founded that 
year, forming a way for funding for central government to be channelled to 
the arts (at ‘arm’s length’); it had a devolved ‘Scottish Committee’, which 
became the Scottish Arts Council in 1967. The Local Government Act of 1948 
went further in allowing local authorities to support not only the practice of 
                                                
2 ‘Edinburgh Civic Theatre Plan Disputed’, Scotsman, 2 May 1961. 
3 ‘Lyceum Development Plan Falls Through’, Scotsman, 10 December 1963. 
4 A full discussion of post-1945 theatre architecture in Britain may be found in Alistair Fair, 
Modern Playhouses: an Architectural History of Britain’s New Theatres, 1945-1985, Oxford, 2018. 
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the arts but also the buildings in which the arts were housed, paving the way 
for the emergence of ‘civic theatres’. In 1965, the Arts Council’s budget was 
significantly increased after the election of a Labour government under 
Harold Wilson, and a dedicated ‘Housing the Arts’ fund was set up by the 
country’s first Minister for the Arts, Jennie Lee, to part-fund building projects. 
She sought to stimulate local action, for although there had been some notable 
early developments, such as Coventry’s Belgrade Theatre (1958), few local 
authorities had yet really embraced the possibilities of the 1948 Act. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, new theatres were increasingly built. In Scotland, the key 
examples include Eden Court, Inverness (1976), Pitlochry Festival Theatre 
(1981), and Dundee Repertory Theatre (1982), as well as smaller venues in 
such places as Dumbarton (1969) and Musselburgh (1971). 
 
Public funding for the arts was never total. In 1970, for example, it was 
reported that regional theatres typically recovered 75% of their costs from 
ticket sales, with subsidy and other income covering the remaining 25%.5 The 
construction of new theatre buildings, too, typically was supported by several 
sources of funding, including local-authority support, ‘Housing the Arts’ 
grants, and local fundraising.6 Nonetheless, the advent of subsidy had 
significant effects. Commercial touring circuits like that of Howard and 
Wyndham declined because public funding favoured non-profit ‘Repertory’ 
theatres (as well as the major London venues such as the Royal Opera House). 
Such theatres embodied three general assumptions. First, provision for the 
arts in London was to be balanced (at least in theory) by a focus on the 
English regions, Scotland, and Wales. Second, the professional was to be 
supported rather than the amateur. Third, within the professional sphere, 
                                                
5 Arts Council of Great Britain, ‘The Theatre Today in England and Wales: the report of the 
Arts Council Theatre Enquiry’, London, 1970, p. 35. 
6 Roderick Ham, Theatre Planning, London, 1972, p. 249. 
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populist, commercial entertainment was often deemed to be of less cultural 
value than the mixed programmes presented by the Repertory companies.7 In 
this respect, theatres emerged as a kind of public amenity, embedded in 
broader debates: the place of culture and leisure in an increasingly affluent, 
modern Britain, for example, or the potential for a new theatre to contribute to 
narratives of civic pride.  
 
The Edinburgh ‘opera house’ remained unbuilt. Had it been constructed, it 
would have been one of the most significant examples of the post-war 
theatre-building boom, taking its place alongside the contemporaneous and 
similarly unexecuted Cultural Centre proposed for central Glasgow.8 In 1967, 
the Scotsman described the recent history of the Edinburgh project as a ‘saga’; 
in 1975, the year in which the scheme was formally abandoned, it deployed a 
similarly literary metaphor in referring to a ‘farce in five acts’ which offered 
‘an object lesson in how not to get things done’.9 In the Architects’ Journal in 
1974, the Edinburgh-based architect Ian Appleton likened it to the ‘Loch Ness 
monster […] part of local mythology’.10 What went wrong? This article draws 
on contemporary records to present an initial discussion of the ‘saga’. Its 
conclusions are preliminary: more work could productively be done on such 
areas as the local politics that were involved. Here it is suggested that the 
failure of the project needs to be understood within a broader context, namely 
the major programme of theatre-building which took place across Scotland 
and Britain between the late 1950s and the early 1980s. In this respect, the 
                                                
7 Lawrence Black, ‘“Making Britain a Gayer and More Cultivated Country”: Jennie Lee, the 
Creative Economy, and the 1960s’ “Cultural Revolution”’, Contemporary British History, vol. 
20/3, 2006, pp. 323–42. 
8 For Glasgow, see Fair, Modern Playhouses, and Florian Urban, ‘Glasgow’s Royal Concert Hall 
and the Invention of the Post-modern City’, Journal of Architecture, vol. 18/2, 2013, pp. 254–96. 
9 ‘The Opera House: a Farce in Five Acts’, Scotsman, 3 May 1975. 
10 “Edinburgh’s Opera House’, Architects’ Journal 160 (24 July 1974), pp. 200–201. 
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story of the ‘opera house’ allows us to refine our understanding of cultural 
politics in post-war Britain.  
 
‘CREDIT AS A FESTIVAL CITY’: KININMONTH’S DESIGNS, 1960-71 
Meyer Oppenheim’s proposals of 1961 for a new theatre adjacent to the Usher 
Hall were not the first for this site. Patrick Abercrombie and Derek 
Plumstead’s Civic Survey and Plan of 1949 had proposed the construction of 
two ‘festival centres’ for the newly established Edinburgh Festival, one at St 
James’ Square and one on Lothian Road.11 During the 1950s, architects 
including Alan Reiach produced designs for the latter.12 The perceived need 
was a venue for large operatic productions. In 1962, for example, Lord 
Harewood noted that in early days of the Festival, Glyndebourne and 
German productions could fit in the King’s Theatre, but now the Germany 
companies were increasingly moving into larger, new opera houses and so to 
play in Edinburgh would force them to restage their productions.13  
 
That the proposals of 1961 were made by a developer is unusual in view of 
the fact that the vast majority of Britain’s major new theatres in the 1960s and 
1970s were part-public funded. However, several theatres in London, 
including the New London Theatre (1971) were similarly conceived by 
developers, while some local authorities worked in partnership with 
development firms: new theatres in Derby and Leicester, for example, were 
built within shopping centres. Such partnerships were partly pragmatic, 
reflecting the extent to which subsidy was not provided as a blank cheque. In 
addition, restrictions on local-authority expenditure were frequently imposed 
by central government. In Edinburgh, the support of the Progressives for the 
                                                
11 Patrick Abercrombie and Derek Plumstead, A Civic Survey and Plan for the City and Royal 
Burgh of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 1949, p. 57. 
12 ‘Plan Clears Way for Opera House’, Scotsman, 9 March 1968. 
13 ‘Opera House a Must for the Festival?’, Edinburgh Evening News, 5 September 1962. 
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Oppenheim scheme demonstrates both a more general Tory scepticism of 
excessive state involvement in funding the arts as well as the Progressives’ 
anti-interventionism.14 
 
Oppenheim’s architect was William Kininmonth of Rowand Anderson, 
Kininmonth and Paul (RAKP).15 The firm was retained after 1964, when the 
project was essentially taken ‘in-house’ by the Corporation,16 apparently 
without consideration of alternatives because of his friendship with the Lord 
Provost.17  Kininmonth had been a fixture on the Edinburgh architectural 
scene since the 1930s, when he had practised with Basil Spence. In parallel 
with the ‘opera house’, his office was working on designs for the Brunton 
Theatre and municipal offices at Musselburgh.  
 
In July 1965 it was stated that the Castle Terrace project would deliver ‘a large 
theatre in which grand opera can be staged in such a way as to bring credit to 
Edinburgh as a festival city’.18 Below a 1600-seat auditorium would be a 
smaller 800-seat theatre described as an ‘arena’ whose rejection of the hitherto 
dominant proscenium-arch layout reflected a growing search for alternatives 
that might promote greater contact between actor and audience and which 
might suggest the uniquely live, three-dimensional nature of theatre. There 
was also to be a 120-bedroom hotel, to be operated by Scottish and Newcastle 
and designed by Andrew Renton,19 while the theatres’ ‘ample foyers’ would 
include a restaurant. The scale of the scheme was presented as a coup for the 
                                                
14 ‘The Odds Favour Oppenheim’, Scotsman, 24 July 1962: Labour and Liberal politicians 
opposed the Oppenheim scheme. 
15 ‘City to buy Proposed Theatre’, Scotsman, 15 September 1961. 
16 ‘Theatre Architect Appointed’, Architects’ Journal 140 (23 December 1964), p. 1481. 
17 The allegation was attributed to a Corporation official in NRS, ED61/86, Sir Norman 
Graham to I.M. Robertson, 17 August 1972. 
18 NRS, ED61/70, Press Statement, 29 July 1965. 
19 ‘Astragal: Poor Man’s Festival’, Architects’ Journal 144 (31 August 1966), p. 506. 
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city and a major expression of civic pride: Magnus Magnusson, for example, 
commented that ‘Edinburgh has once again snatched the lead from Glasgow 
in this field of large-scale cultural planning’.20 
 
Kininmonth toured opera houses in continental Europe, writing in detail on 
the West German examples that he saw (though favouring the ‘lighter’ styles 
he saw elsewhere).21 From 1965, he was also assisted by a panel of specialists 
in the technical side of theatre design. This group was led by the experienced 
theatre director Norman Marshall, who had been a member of the panel that 
appointed Denys Lasdun to design the National Theatre in London and 
subsequently was co-chair of the National’s infamously fractious Building 
Committee.22 The Renton/Kininmonth proposals of late 1966 (fig. 1) 
accommodate the hotel in a boldly massed tower which in plan stepped 
regularly outwards, while the theatre is set within a block that looks not 
unlike Le Corbusier’s monastery of Sainte Marie de La Tourette (1956–60). 
Internally, the ‘opera’ theatre recalled recent West German examples in such 
details as the ‘sledges’ of seating at either side of the auditorium that 
projected forwards from the rear balconies.23 However, a redesign was soon 
necessary. Scottish and Newcastle claimed that factors including the 
introduction of Selective Employment Tax made the hotel unviable, and they 
withdrew in 1967,24 while the city authorities had concerns about the cost of 
the theatre.25 The next design of 1968 moved the hotel to the opposite side of 
                                                
20 ‘The Pound Barrier is Broken At Last’, Scotsman, 30 July 1965. 
21 ‘Report on Continental Theatres’, Architects’ Journal 141 (30 June 1965), pp. 1525–1526. 
22 NRS, ED61/82, Ronald Mavor to Lord Goodman, 18 April 1969; Barnabas Calder, 
‘Committees and Concrete: the Genesis and Architecture of Denys Lasdun's National 
Theatre’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2007, pp. 46 and 52. 
23 NRS, ED61/72, Rowand Anderson Kininmonth and Paul, ‘Lyceum/Castle Terrace 
Redevelopment, Edinburgh’, 16 November 1966. 
24 NRS, ED61/72, I.M. Robertson memo, 18 August 1967. 
25 ‘Poor Man’s Festival’, p. 506. 
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Lothian Road,26 while the theatre abandoned the Corbusianism of the 
previous scheme (fig. 2). Its horizontal windows and stepped-back terraces 
evoke Lasdun’s contemporaneous designs for the National Theatre in 
London, though in rather more symmetrical form.27  At the centre of the 
Cambridge Street front, a series of ‘columns’ suggest a classical portico 
filtered through an Art Deco lens. The auditorium, the design of which was 
based on an outline functional brief developed with the input of the technical 
advisory panel, seemingly lost its ‘sledges’ and ended up as a rather 
unexciting four-tier space with straight sides.  
 
Storm clouds were brewing, however, with the Scotsman referring in 
December 1968 to ‘Despondency at Opera House Delays’.28 The issue was the 
amount of funding from central government that the project might attract. 
With a cost estimate of £3 million in 1966,29 it would be hard for the local 
authority to fund through the Local Government Act, and it was also 
significantly more expensive than was allowed for by the routine ‘Housing 
the Arts’ scheme, which allocated £250,000 to the whole of England, Scotland, 
and Wales in 1965, and £500,000 in subsequent years.30 The limited nature of 
the ‘Housing the Arts’ allocation and the practice of awarding between 15% 
and 25% of capital costs meant that there was an upper limit on the value of 
eligible schemes.31 What were described as ‘monster projects’ were considered 
as special cases,32 with funding being largely dependent on the extent to 
which they were projects of ‘national’ significance. As a result, the Edinburgh 
                                                
26 ‘Plan Clears Way for Opera House’. There were also concerns about the height of the 1966 
hotel, which prompted the development of a High Buildings Policy for the city. 
27 NRS, ED61/83, Drawings of October 1968. 
28 ‘Feeling of Despondency at Opera House Delays’, Scotsman, 30 December 1968. 
29 ‘“Squeeze” Will Hit Lyceum Plan’ Evening News, 15 July 1966.  
30 Patricia Hollis, Jennie Lee: a Life, Oxford, 1997, p. 268. 
31 For the percentages: V&A Theatre Collections, London, ACGB/120/9, HTA minutes, 25 June 
1975. 
32 NRS, ED61/82, ‘Major Capital Projects for the Arts’, 10 April 1970.   
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‘opera house’ was now increasingly presented as a project of ‘national’ 
importance rather than a venue for the festival alone. Indeed, by the mid 
1970s, it was proposed that a ‘National Theatre of Scotland’ company would 
be based there.33 
 
In December 1966, the Lord Provost and other members of the Corporation 
met Jennie Lee, Lord Goodman (then Chairman of the Arts Council of Great 
Britain), and Scottish Office staff.34 Lee and Goodman felt doubtful that the 
Arts Council would be able to find the £2 million that was requested, but 
proposed that the Arts Council write to the Department of Education and 
Science (which oversaw Arts Council funding) to make Edinburgh’s case. The 
following summer, further pressure was applied by William Ross, Secretary 
of State for Scotland:  
in view of our stated intention to increase the cultural opportunities for 
those living outside London, it would be impossible to justify refusing 
assistance to the Lyceum project when we have decided to meet half 
the estimated cost of the £7.5m for the National Theatre.35 
In late 1968, the Corporation was informed that further information was 
required if its request was to be formally considered, including an assurance 
of Scottish Arts Council support and an indication of running costs.36 It was 
speculated that government wanted the Corporation to develop the project to 
the stage where it could be put out to tender, something which would cost 
£150,000 and which the Corporation was reluctant to do without a reasonable 
guarantee that the project would proceed.37 It seemed that an impasse had 
been reached. In 1970, the new (and famously musical) Conservative Prime 
                                                
33 E.g. NRS, ED61/59, Castle Terrace Theatres: Scheme Design. City of Edinburgh District 
Council Architect’s Department, 10 September 1975. 
34 NRS, ED61/72, I.M. Robertson memo, 2 December 1966. 
35 NRS, ED61/72, Drafts and final copy of letter, summer 1967. 
36 ‘Edinburgh Decision on Opera House Shelved Until After Festival’, Scotsman, 17 July 1969. 
37 ‘Feeling of Despondency at Opera House Delays’. 
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Minister, Edward Heath, was reportedly keen, but his Minister for the Arts, 
Lord Eccles, was not to be rushed.38 During this hiatus, design work 
essentially stopped, although Kininmonth presented a slightly revised model 
at the Royal Scottish Academy’s 1971 show.39 The rooftop restaurant now 
sported a low dome, intended to complement the adjacent Usher Hall in 
views from Princes Street. The flytower above the stage gained an odd, 
vaguely Soaneian dome, as appropriated by Giles Gilbert Scott for the classic 
‘K2’ and ‘K6’ telephone kiosks. The upper part of the building also acquired a 
regular series of narrow vertical windows, not unlike RAKP’s Scottish 
Provident Institution building (1961). 
 
In August 1971, the Corporation was offered either 50% of an agreed final 
capital cost, or £2.25 million, to be revalued according to the Department of 
the Environment’s index in order to take account of changes in building costs 
between the date of the offer and a point midway through period of 
construction.40 Given the amount of time that had elapsed since the essentials 
of the design had been determined, a round of consultation was proposed in 
order to reappraise and develop the outline functional brief,41 and to that end, 
attention was given to what the potential ‘users’ of the building might want.42 
‘Policies’ were presented in May 1972, with a detailed design brief being 
intended to follow. However, by then, RAKP’s position had been called into 
question. 
 
‘A LENGTHY WHINE PUNCTUATED BY DARK REFERENCES TO 
“PLOTS”’: THE DEPOSITION OF KININMONTH 
                                                
38 ‘Give Us Our Opera House’, Scotsman, 18 July 1970. 
39 NRS, ED61/84, Meeting minutes, 14 June 1971. 
40 NRS, ED61/85, IM Robertson to Town Clerk, 20 August 1971. 
41 NRS, ED61/85, Alexander Dunbar to I.M. Robertson, 26 October 1971. 
42 Edinburgh City Archives [hereafter ‘ECA’], Lord Provost’s Committee files [‘LPC files’], 
Castle Terrace folder 17, Note by the Town Clerk, 16 November 1972. 
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In September 1971, Ian M. Robertson, Under-Secretary in the Scottish 
Education Department (SED) with responsibility for Higher Education and 
the Arts, reported on a meeting with the Scottish Development Department 
(SDD) Chief Architect, Bruce Beckett, and surveyor, Brian Drake. They were, 
he noted 
concerned that the building on which we are about to give grant 
should be a worthy one both architecturally and functionally. They do 
not much like the exterior appearance of the sketches and models so far 
prepared by Mr Kininmonth and I think they feel that if a satisfactory 
building is to result Mr Kininmonth’s firm will need to be supported 
by a good deal of expert advice.43 
They were not the first to criticise the design. However, their views would 
prove to have significant consequences. In autumn 1972, RAKP was 
dismissed. 
 
In press comments, Kininmonth alleged that he was the victim of a plot.44 
Certainly the Scottish Office files bear out the idea that efforts were made to 
encourage his dismissal. One civil servant, for example, recorded in April 
1972 that ‘it is useful that the City Architect should have injected into the 
minds of the Lord Provost Committee [sic] that no-one should be thirled to 
the present draft brief for the Castle Terrace development’.45 In the same vein, 
a draft minute of August 1972 noted one councillor’s view that ‘officials had 
been dissatisfied with Sir William and they were trying to get the elected 
members of the Corporation to take responsibility for dismissing Sir 
William.’46 In another note, the recently appointed City Architect, Brian 
                                                
43 NRS, ED61/85, Robertson memo, 27 September 1971. 
44 E.g. ‘Opera Architect Accuses Civil Servants’, Scotsman, 21 October 1972. 
45 NRS, ED61/85, J Kidd memo, 17 April 1972. 
46 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 15, Note of Meeting on 28 August 1972,  
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Annable, commented that Kininmonth’s claims of secret representations 
intended to undermine him were only a ‘half-truth’.47  
 
What were the perceived problems? In November 1971, Beckett and Drake 
outlined their views in detail, taking aim at the project brief, the way in which 
RAKP had been appointed without reference to the City Architect,48 the 
design, and RAKP’s managerial competence: 
We feel that we should set down as briefly as possible our concern for 
the above project. It was clear from Tuesday’s meeting that there is no 
written brief for the project, that such brief as does exist is in the mind 
of Mr Kininmonth and his staff and has been derived from the shortest 
of general statements by the Corporation coupled with advice from an 
incomplete list of advisers who may well represent something less than 
the latest thinking on theatrical matters. It is evident that Mr 
Kininmonth has no knowledge of modern approaches to cost control 
and it is also clear that this difficult and complicated project lacks any 
system of project management whatsoever. We understand that Mr 
Kininmonth’s appointment was on the direct recommendation of a 
previous Lord Provost with no special architectural knowledge and 
without reference either to the Department or indeed to his own City 
Architect.  
 
We are convinced that if present policies are pursued there is every 
prospect of an expensive fiasco; quite certainly the design which Mr 
Kininmonth has produced is poorly planned, dull, pedestrian, and 
totally unworthy of such an important building and site. This view is 
                                                
47 NRS, ED61/86, photocopy of letter from Kininmonth to Edward Glendinning, 1 September 
1972. 
48 In discussion (April 2017), Annable stressed the ‘improper’ nature of Kininmonth’s 
appointment as the key concern. 
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also held by influential members of the lay and technical press who 
will ensure a great deal of embarrassment for the Secretary of State 
unless an alternative approach is adopted.49 
Beckett and his colleagues were not alone. For example, it was reported that 
the Royal Fine Art Commission for Scotland (RFACS), which had professed 
itself satisfied with the 1968 scheme, ‘now felt some anxiety’.50 A letter 
published in the Architects’ Journal was scarcely more complimentary: ‘Mr 
Kininmonth claims his buildings speak for themselves; they speak very 
convincingly in favour of a limited competition’.51 
 
In February 1972, Robertson chaired a meeting at the SED, which concluded 
that RAKP would have to be replaced.52 The grounds on which change was 
advocated now also included criticism of the auditorium and stage layout: 
‘The aim should be a plan with flair and imagination based on […] post-war 
theatre projects including Ontario, Minneapolis, Chichester, and the Crucible 
at Sheffield’. In naming theatres which had rejected the proscenium-arch 
stage for projecting ‘thrust’ stages, this argument perhaps misunderstood the 
extent to which tradition held sway in opera-house design, as well as in 
theatres that received touring shows. The examples named all staged their 
own productions and so could afford to experiment with the actor/audience 
relationship. Beckett proposed that Renton Howard Wood (RHW), the 
designers of the Crucible, might productively take over in Edinburgh; 
alternatively, he favoured Robert Matthew Johnson-Marshall (RMJM).53 A 
design competition was suggested, potentially to be chaired by Leslie Martin, 
who had been the Deputy Architect to the London County Council at the time 
                                                
49 NRS, ED61/85, B.P. Beckett and B.E. Drake to I.M. Robertson, 12 November 1971.  
50 NRS, ED61/85, I.M. Robertson memo, 29 September 1971. 
51 ‘Edinburgh Opera House’, Architects’ Journal 156 (13 December 1972), p. 1339. 
52 NRS, ED61/85, meeting at SED, 8 February 1972. 
53 Ibid. 
 14 
of the Festival Hall’s design and construction. Other judges mentioned 
included Alex Gordon (then President of the RIBA) and Denys Lasdun.  
 
In February 1972, Beckett reported that the technical design of the building 
was, in fact, not bad.54 RAKP had, he said, obviously been well-advised, in 
spite of the apparent absence of a detailed brief, and so that in itself could 
hardly be grounds for dismissal. In any case, the absence of a developed brief 
was not necessarily the architect’s fault: ‘there might be presentational 
difficulties in arguing that this was a further reason for seeking Sir William’s 
dismissal’.55 Beckett nonetheless alleged that Peter Moro – the well-regarded 
architect of the Nottingham Playhouse (1963) – had resigned from the 
technical panel because ‘although he felt that the basic planning of the 
building was about right he was unhappy with the architectural expression of 
it and did not want to be associated with the building which he felt must now 
result.’56 Yet questions of aesthetics were essentially subjective. The Lord 
Provost responded by arguing that Kininmonth was a distinguished architect 
who had been knighted and was President of the Royal Scottish Academy.57 It 
would therefore be hard, he felt, for the Corporation to question his approach. 
 
In April 1972, the Lord Provost’s Committee – which took the key decisions 
concerning the project – decided to assess the capacity of the various firms 
involved.58 The question of staffing had been brought into focus by the 
expansion of the project brief. The review of 1971–72 had altered the purpose 
of the ‘opera house’, which was now conceived more clearly as a multi-
purpose theatre staging its own productions as well as receiving touring 
                                                
54 NRS, ED61/85, I.M. Robertson memo, 22 February 1972. 
55 NRS, ED61/85, meeting at SED, 8 February 1972. 
56 NRS, ED61/85, I.M. Robertson memo, 22 February 1972. 
57 NRS, ED61/85, I.M. Robertson memo, 3 March 1972. 
58 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 17, Note by the Town Clerk, 16 November 1972. 
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opera; it therefore needed expanded backstage facilities for a resident 
company. Particular attention was given to the junction between auditorium 
and stage in order to achieve the acoustic and physical conditions needed for 
opera and drama. The project also now included the internal reconstruction of 
the Lyceum and its connection to the new theatre and Usher Hall, a project 
itself estimated to cost some £1 million. A meeting was convened to consider 
whether RAKP was large enough to cope with this expanded brief: ‘if 
slippage in the time table and possible design errors were to be avoided, the 
whole question of Sir William’s continuing as the sole architect must be 
considered.’59 Kininmonth suggested that two further architects and ten 
assistants might be employed, but there was concern that the newly hired 
staff would be aware that the office had expanded for this one project alone, 
and so would soon be looking to move on in the expectation that they would 
be laid off when it was completed. Partnership with another firm might solve 
the problem, but Annable and colleagues reported further reservations. 
Kininmonth, they argued, was sixty-eight years old, and ‘performance by his 
junior staff was patchy’.60 There were fears that he would not survive the job.61 
(This assumption was not entirely unreasonable, given that his 
contemporaries, Spence and Matthew, would both be dead by 1976, although 
in fact Kininmonth was to live until 1988.)  
 
During the summer of 1972, Kininmonth was summoned for talks that 
apparently were so confidential that, within the Corporation, only the Lord 
Provost was fully aware of developments.62 He appeared before the Lord 
Provost’s Committee in August 1972, with an unofficial (and hardly 
                                                
59 NRS, ED61/86, Notes of meeting between Scottish Office and Edinburgh Corporation 
officials, 4 July 1972. 
60 Ibid. 
61 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 15, Brian Annable to Jack Kane, 10 August 1972. 
62 NRS, ED61/86, I.M. Robertson memo, 18 July 1972. 
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complementary) record of the meeting being taken by Brian Drake. 
Kininmonth was invited to speak: ‘there then followed a lengthy whine 
punctuated by dark references to “plots”’.63 His contributions were described 
as unconstructive; he apparently failed to understand questions of staffing 
and contracts. He reportedly refused to enter into a ‘single project 
partnership’ with RHW, preferring instead Law and Dunbar-Nasmith, then 
engaged on designs for new theatres at Inverness and Pitlochry, or a 
European architect with experience of opera house design. After Kininmonth 
had left the meeting, Drake reminded the committee that, in view of the large 
sum of money promised to the project, the Scottish Office sought its artistic 
and architectural success. Kininmonth, he went on, had been about to 
commence detailed design without a detailed brief: he had ‘found it possible 
to produce drawings and models of a project for which a brief did not exist 
and that furthermore informed opinion seemed almost unanimously to 
condemn the design offered as far below the standards required for such an 
important project.’64 Drake also argued that the project needed one building 
contractor and therefore one architect. The Lyceum, he suggested, could not 
practically be given to another designer, as Kininmonth had proposed. 
Drake’s note concluded by reporting that even members of the committee 
who had previously been opposed to dismissing RAKP seemed to be coming 
round to the idea.  
 
The files now contain a flurry of correspondence and memoranda. 
Kininmonth protested to Sir Norman Graham, the Secretary of the SED, 
claiming that to stand down would be fatal to his firm.65 There was further 
discussion of the terms on which RAKP had been appointed in the first place. 
                                                
63 NRS, ED61/86, B.E. Drake memo on the committee meeting, 11 August 1972. 
64 Ibid. 
65 NRS, ED61/86, Norman Graham memo, 17 August 1972. 
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It seems to have been hoped that a formal appointment had not been made, 
allowing the Corporation now to claim that RAKP’s work had only ever been 
preliminary.66 Continuing attempts were made to force Kininmonth into a 
partnership, and various firms were approached.67 Kininmonth, however, 
maintained his opposition to working with Andrew Renton (as he had done 
in 1966), apparently because RHW had no office in Scotland.68 Robert 
Matthew he had no quarrel with, but he felt that RMJM were poor 
administrators and so he would enter into partnership with them only under 
protest. His preference remained Law and Dunbar-Nasmith, but their office 
was deemed too small to make a material difference to the administration of 
the project.69 His other suggestions were Alan Reiach, or Spence Glover and 
Ferguson. Kininmonth was asked to approach Spence, Reiach, as well as 
Matthew, but none was keen.70  
 
Were the negotiations doomed to fail? Kininmonth’s demand for an equal 
partnership was natural enough, but was unappealing. Robert Matthew, for 
example, turned down the proposal, perhaps tactically stressing the need for 
a ‘clear line of command’, while the Lord Provost’s Committee noted that 
‘progress [in the creation and management of a partnership] might well be 
impeded by the fact of the appointment of the present firm’.71 In addition, as 
Kininmonth suspected, the archival record suggests a preference for a clean 
                                                
66 NRS, ED61/86, J. Kidd memo, 29 August 1972. 
67 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 17, letter to RMJM, 21 September 1972. 
68 NRS, ED61/86, William Kininmonth to Edward Glendinning, 1 September 1972. One 
wonders also if there was a personality clash. In 1972, Annable noted that Renton had been a 
‘prima donna’ designer in the past. See ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 14, Brian 
Annable to Edward Glendinning, 24 July 1972. Folder 15, ‘Theatre Developments’, 1 August 
1972, states that Kininmonth did not like Renton. 
69 Kininmonth rejected that assessment: ‘it is now painfully obvious [it] did not suit the plans 
of your architectural advisers’. See ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 16, Kininmonth to 
Lord Provost, 16 October 1972. 
70 NRS, ED61/86, report by Annable to Lord Provost’s Committee, 15 September 1972. 
71 ECA, LPC files, folder 16, Robert Matthew to Brian Annable, 13 October 1972; Lord 
Provost’s Committee minutes, 20 September 1972. 
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break. Beckett considered that RMJM’s John Richards was ‘was one of the best 
young architects in the United Kingdom’, a ringing endorsement that 
suggests that Richards was potentially being lined up to do more than execute 
RAKP’s design.72 Indeed, Annable suggested to RMJM that a single firm 
would be appointed if a single project partnership was not possible, 
prompting Kininmonth to claim that RMJM was being invited to refuse a 
partnership in order to secure the project entirely for themselves.73 
Meanwhile, senior civil servants concluded that ‘it would be better to face the 
adverse publicity of getting rid of Sir William than the much greater 
difficulties of delay and in-effectiveness in the Opera House planning.’74 A 
handwritten note in the Lord Provost’s Committee files similarly records that 
‘govt. would be embarrassed by any return to Sir W.K.’75  
 
In September 1972, the Corporation terminated RAKP’s appointment, 
ostensibly to force the creation of a single project partnership.76 Extensive 
press coverage followed. By November, however, despite protests, RAKP had 
been decisively dispatched, their work to date being described as a feasibility 
study.77 Indeed, the documentation issued by the Corporation in 1973 implied 
that a new appointment at this stage in the project had always been 
intended.78 
 
THE RMJM SCHEMES, 1973–1975 
                                                
72 NRS, ED61/86, J. Kidd memo, 29 August 1972. 
73 ECA, LPC files, folder 17, Kininmonth to Lord Provost, 1 November 1972. 
74 NRS, ED61/86, J. Kidd memo, 29 August 1972. 
75 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 15, undated note [September 1972]. 
76 ECA, LPC Files, Note by the Town Clerk on the Castle Terrace Theatre Project, 16 
November 1972. 
77 ‘Opera House: Kininmonth out’’, Architects’ Journal 156 (1 November 1972), p. 991. 
78 ECA, LPC files, Castle Terrace folder 17, ‘Interviews with Private Architects’, 29 June 1973.  
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The selection of a new architect began in earnest in May 1973. Annable briefly 
sought to capture the project for the City Architect’s office, but withdrew 
before the matter could be discussed by councillors.79 The RIBA proposed 
Denys Lasdun, Spence Glover and Ferguson, RMJM, Casson and Conder, 
RHW, Arup Associates, and Colin St-John Wilson.80 Several had theatre 
experience. We have already encountered RHW and Lasdun, while RMJM 
was responsible for the Macrobert Centre at Stirling University, and Casson 
and Conder had designed the well-received Wyvern Arts Centre in Swindon. 
Notably, with the exceptions of RMJM and Spence Glover and Ferguson, all 
were based in England. The presumption appears to have been that a firm 
with a national reputation – defined in terms of the UK – was required, along 
with experience of ‘prestige’ projects. Alexander Dunbar of the Scottish Arts 
Council offered some thoughts on the list, drawn in part from discussions 
with colleagues.81 Lasdun was ‘excellent but expensive’; he and Wilson were 
thought to be the highest calibre designers. Casson and Conder’s Wyvern 
Arts Centre was praised, as was RHW’s Crucible, while the Macrobert Centre 
was thought to be ‘interesting and intimate’, if acoustically problematic owing 
to late changes in the brief. Spence Glover and Ferguson were linked with two 
university venues which in fact had been designed by Spence’s London office, 
namely the Nuffield at Southampton and the Gardner Arts Centre at Sussex, 
neither of which was felt to be good. Dunbar proposed several additional 
names, including Chamberlin Powell and Bon (designers of the Barbican Arts 
Centre in London), Leslie Martin, Gollins Melvin Ward, and two architects 
known as specialists in theatre design, Peter Moro and Roderick Ham. Moro 
was also suggested by the theatre consultant Martin Carr.82 At a meeting at 
the Town Clerk’s home one Sunday afternoon in late July 1973, the list was 
                                                
79 NRS, ED61/87, ‘Selection of Architect’, 29 June 1973, and I.M. Robertson memo, 9 July 1973. 
80 NRS, ED61/87, Lorraine Kelly to Edward Glendinning, 26 June 1973. 
81 NRS, ED61/87, Alexander Dunbar to Edward Glendinning, 19 July 1973. 
82 NRS, ED61/87, Martin Carr to Annable, 10 July 1973. 
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considered.83 Spence, Casson and Conder, and Lasdun had reportedly 
declined to be considered owing to pressure of work.84 RMJM, RHW, and 
Wilson seemed to be the frontrunners, and Beckett told the group that he 
would be happy with any of them. The choice was put to councillors, Annable 
presenting the options with the aid of slides. Although Annable favoured 
RHW on the basis of the Crucible and Warwick Arts Centre, the project was 
given to RMJM.85 
 
Building Design considered the result ‘a favourite son vote’.86 RMJM had an 
Edinburgh base and had completed a series of major projects in the city, while 
Matthew himself was something of an architectural grandee with an 
international profile as an ‘organiser’. Given the opera house’s turbulent 
history, he may well have been considered a safe pair of hands, well-used to 
complex projects in sensitive places. Matthew promised that he would 
supervise the job himself, and that he would set up a dedicated design team 
under Kenneth Graham and John Richards. Several pencil sketches 
experimenting with the layout of the theatre testify to Matthew’s personal 
involvement.87 His interest in the project surely reflected the extent to which it 
could be conceived, like the Festival Hall before it,88 in Geddesian terms as a 
kind of ‘outlook tower’ in which a community’s ‘cultural essence’ might be 
distilled, but understood now at a national as well as a city level. Certainly 
Matthew referred to a ‘building of exceptional national and civic 
                                                
83 NRS, ED61/87, Bruce Beckett to Norman Graham, 23 July 1973. 
84 That said, Annable recalled (in discussion with the author, 18 April 2017) that he had 
interviewed Lasdun for the job. 
85 ‘Architects Named for Opera House’, Scotsman, 24 July 1973. 
86 Miles Glendinning, Modern Architect: the Life and Times of Robert Matthew, London, 2008, p. 
447. 
87 Edinburgh University Library, Centre for Research Collections, RHM29, pencil sketches by 
Matthew. 
88 Glendinning, Modern Architect, pp. 89-90. 
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importance’.89 It may well have been a particularly appealing project given 
that Matthew had chaired the panel that chose Lasdun to design the National 
in London, and so had effectively ruled himself out of that project. 
Furthermore, Matthew had long been convinced of the virtues of Geddesian 
‘conservative surgery’, something which made his recent enthusiasm for 
architectural conservation over the kind of comprehensive development with 
which he had been associated in the 1950s and 1960s less of a volte-face than it 
might initially appear.90 Faced with a prominent site that comprised a ‘hole in 
the ground’, cleared by the city authorities in the 1960s when construction 
seemed imminent, here was a prime opportunity to repair the urban fabric. 
That said, Miles Glendinning has speculated that Matthew may well have 
concluded that the project would never be built, seeing it instead as a 
lucrative source of income for RMJM during the mid-seventies recession.91  
 
The brief now comprised a 1400-seat theatre for opera and drama, a 250-seat 
studio theatre, as well as the refurbishment and integration into the new 
building of the Lyceum. With three auditoria of different kinds (including the 
Lyceum), the project was as big as the National Theatre in London.92 
Numerous auditorium concepts were drawn and evaluated during 1973; a 
press release in July 1974 stated that ’10,000 man-hours’ had been expended 
on the auditorium alone.93 Regular meetings were held with Annable and his 
Deputy, Stuart Harris, as well as Sandy Brown (the acoustician), and the 
theatre consultants. Early in 1974, the design team visited twenty-one theatres 
                                                
89 NRS, ED61/88, Robert Matthew to Stuart Harris, 14 August 1974. 
90 Miles Glendinning, ‘The “Grand Plan”: Robert Matthew and the Triumph of Conservation 
in Scotland’, Architectural Heritage, vol. 16, 2005, pp. 72-102. 
91 Glendinning, Modern Architect, p. 448. 
92 Glendinning, Modern Architect, p. 448. 
93 Edinburgh University Library, Centre for Research Collections, RHM29, drawings of Castle 
Terrace Theatre auditorium options; NRS, ED61/88, Press Release, 3 July 1974. 
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and opera houses in West Germany and Switzerland.94 Their first designs 
were ready by the summer of 1974 (figs 3 and 4).95 The key move was to turn 
the auditorium through forty-five degrees so that it no longer lay parallel to 
Castle Terrace but now occupied a diagonal position on the site. Not only 
that, but the building was cantilevered out above Castle Terrace, essentially 
‘borrowing’ the space above the carriageway. It presented a compact mass, 
faced in sandstone and copper, and dominated by an angled wall of glazing 
through which the foyers were to be visible. The auditorium betrayed the 
influence of John Bury, the prominent scenic designer well-known for his 
work with the Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC) and who had been 
engaged as one of two theatre consultants on the Edinburgh project, 
alongside the technical specialist Martin Carr. For example, the sides of the 
auditorium featured forward-facing sledges on the Barbican model. (The key 
difference is in the means of access to the auditorium: the seating rows in 
Edinburgh were to be interrupted by aisles, unlike the Barbican’s side 
gangways, separated from the auditorium itself by narrow doors.) The stage, 
meanwhile, was large, although the confines of the site meant that wing-space 
would be limited on one side. Elaborate means of adjusting the position of the 
proscenium arch to suit opera and drama were tested. 
 
RMJM’s design has a weightiness that that might be considered appropriate 
to its purpose, although its extensive glazing suggests a more permeable, 
accessible monumentality than was the case of the rather introverted Usher 
Hall. It would be, according to the Evening News, a ‘futuristic complex’ and ‘a 
space age scheme in sharp contrast to the classical Edwardian Usher Hall 
nearby’.96 However, the RFACS was less convinced. It had warned in early 
                                                
94 NRS, ED61/88, ‘Progress Report 10’, 8 February 1974. 
95 Historic Environment Scotland archive, Edinburgh, RMJM uncatalogued boxes 197 and 198. 
96 ‘Opera House on Show’, Edinburgh Evening News, 5 July 1974. 
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1973 that the brief was ambitious. Its commissioners (including Jack Coia, 
Anthony Wheeler, and Alan Reiach) now considered the design ‘bold and 
ingenious’ but criticised its ‘damaging visual impact and […] adverse effect 
on environmental quality and character’.97 They argued that the 120 ft high fly 
tower above the stage towered excessively above the Usher Hall and that the 
site had been overloaded by a brief that was ‘too ambitious’.98 Matthew had 
earlier justified the tower with Modernist orthodoxy as emblematic of the 
building’s function; ‘what is functional is not necessarily ugly.’99 Earlier in his 
career, he had won battles against conservationists, but, as Glendinning 
argues, the conservation lobby in Edinburgh had since grown in strength.100 
The poorly received example of the St James Centre loomed large as an 
example where a substantial building had been squeezed onto a prominent 
site: was such a similarly large and clearly ‘modern’ building right for Castle 
Terrace?101 Nonetheless, the Scotsman held out in favour of the design, seeing 
it in terms of civic pride and claims to ‘capital city’ status:  
If the project is abandoned or downgraded to that a second-best 
substitute is considered adequate, it will be a sign – yet another sign – 
of civic acceptance of mediocrity. Conservation of parts of Edinburgh’s 
heritage is not enough for a capital, Festival city.102 
A revised scheme of October 1974 reduced the height of the flytower and sank 
the building slightly into the site. Then, in early 1975, a new scheme appeared 
which attempted to play down the bulk of the building by replacing the sheer 
wall of glass with a series of ‘terraces’ (figs 5, 6, and 7).103 They bring to mind 
the dominant horizontality of other contemporaneous RMJM projects, 
                                                
97 ‘Commission Object to Scale of Opera House’, Scotsman, 8 August 1974. 
98 Glendinning, Modern Architect, p. 449. 
99 ‘Plans for Edinburgh’s New £16.7m Theatre Outlined’, Scotsman, 6 July 1974. 
100 Glendinning, Modern Architect, p. 449. 
101 NRS, DD12/3414, copy of letter from Oliver Barratt to the Scotsman, 12 August 1974. 
102 ‘Second-best City?’, Scotsman, 10 August 1974. 
103 Historic Environment Scotland archive, Edinburgh, RMJM uncatalogued box 446. 
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including the Commonwealth Pool in Edinburgh and the University of 
Stirling. Clearly the firm was evolving a kind of universal language of 
Modernism suited to civic projects. A further source, however, was surely the 
terracing of the National Theatre in London. That Lasdun’s work may have 
been in the air at RMJM generally is suggested by the contemporaneous 
teaching block at Stirling University. It forms a long, cranked building whose 
scale and geometries reprised those of Lasdun’s University of East Anglia. 
Lasdun himself noticed the similarities, filing a picture of Stirling in his 
archive with the annotation ‘UEA TEACHING WALL!’104 
 
During 1974, it was hoped that the theatre might be open by the early 1980s. 
However, the project was increasingly living on borrowed time, and not only 
because of the ongoing doubts about its scale and modernity. A civil servant 
wrote in April 1975 that ‘there is no point in further wasting public money in 
decking out the corpse to tender stage.’105 In 1971, it was noted that a growing 
number of councillors saw the project as ‘frill’, while in June 1975 Robertson 
recorded that Labour members would be whipped to vote against the 
scheme.106 Local government reorganisation, furthermore, meant that the old 
Edinburgh Corporation was replaced in 1975 by a new District Council. Both 
it and the new Lothian Regional Council were reported in April that year to 
be ‘unenthusiastic’.107 A vocal group of residents campaigned against the 
‘opera house’, calling instead for upgrades to the 1920s Edinburgh Playhouse. 
One, G.F. Lucas, wrote to the Prime Minister, claiming that the majority of 
                                                
104 RIBA Archives, London, LaD/146/5, ‘For the Record’. I am grateful to Barnabas Calder for 
this information. 
105 NRS, ED61/89, J. Kidd memo, 25 April 1975. 
106 NRS, ED61/83, I.G.F. Gray memo, 1 June 1971; ED61/89, I.M. Robertson memo, 6 June 1975. 
107 NRS, ED61/89, I.M. Robertson to Alexander Dunbar, 18 April 1975. 
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residents did not want an opera house and anticipating unspecified ‘drastic 
action by these people if this scheme should proceed’.108  
 
Costed at £9 million at the start of 1973, severe inflation and design changes 
meant that the estimated cost now exceeded £20 million at a time of 
significant cut-backs in all areas of public expenditure. Although never 
intended for opera alone, the ‘opera house’ label was hardly helpful, its elitist 
connotations no longer suggesting cultural aspiration but rather the frittering 
away of public money on a minority pursuit. During 1974, civil servants 
increasingly seemed to hope that the scheme would be abandoned:  
I have my doubts as to the desirability of public expenditure of this 
magnitude for any one project at this time of financial stringency. […] 
It may be that when final details and costs are available that the 
successor authority to Edinburgh Corporation will have second 
thoughts and relieve us of having to make a decision.109 
The MP Bruce Millan, too, enquired whether government really had 
committed to support the scheme,110 and he encouraged the listing of the 
Playhouse in order to make sure that it was not demolished before the fate of 
the Castle Terrace project was known.111 The issue was not only what it would 
look like to spend this sum of money on a theatre. The money simply was not 
available, especially in the light of competing claims from Glasgow (the 
Burrell Collection, the Concert Hall and Cultural Centre, and the 
refurbishment of the Theatre Royal for Scottish Opera) and elsewhere.112 Yet 
neither the Scottish Office nor local councillors wanted to make the first 
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111 NRS, ED61/88, Minutes of meeting, 6 September 1974; T. Spence memo, 29 September 1974. 
The investigators thought the Playhouse’s elevation ‘respectable but uninspired’ and the 
auditorium of greater interest. 
112 NRS, ED61/89, ‘Castle Terrace Theatre, Edinburgh’, 13 February 1975. 
 26 
move. It was not until late September 1975 that the District Council was 
informed by telephone that the plug had been pulled.113  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
How much was the Castle Terrace project really an ‘object lesson in how not 
to get things done’? In 1974, Stuart Harris reported that the ‘opera house’ was 
hardly the saga that it was often claimed to be: 
The Press and public seem persistently to believe that the Corporation 
have been slow in progressing this project. In fact, considering the 
procedure which local authorities must follow and the interests which 
have to be consulted, a cool look at the history over the last few years 
might reveal a different picture – one of steady and fairly systematic 
progress.114 
Certainly the length of time from inception to anticipated completion was not 
unprecedented. Twenty years would have elapsed between the Oppenheim 
proposals and the projected opening of the RMJM-designed theatre. While 
few regional theatres took quite so long to come to fruition, their gestation 
was nonetheless often protracted. The new Dundee Rep, for example, was 
first discussed in 1963 but did not open until 1981. More comparable is the 
National Theatre in London. After a series of false starts during the first half 
of the twentieth century, an Act of Parliament authorising the Treasury to 
make a financial contribution to its construction was passed in 1949, but the 
theatre did not open until 1976.  
 
As was to be the case in Edinburgh, the National Theatre witnessed a change 
in architect. Brian O’Rorke had been appointed in 1947, but by the early 1960s 
                                                
113 ‘No-one Will Sign Death Warrant for Opera House’, Scotsman, 5 September 1975; NRS, 
ED61/59, Press Release, 25 September 1975. 
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his rather sedate form of Modern architecture had been overshadowed by the 
work of a new generation of designers, and he was replaced in 1963 by 
Lasdun.115 RAKP’s Modernism was as middle-of-the-road as O’Rorke’s: as we 
have seen, Beckett and Drake thought it ‘pedestrian’. During the 1930s, 
Kininmonth’s output had spanned traditional styles and Modernism, and his 
firm’s post-war designs, though typically now more ‘modern’ in appearance, 
demonstrate a similarly undogmatic, visual approach that seemed superficial 
to some critics. The assessments of the Buildings of Scotland, for example, are 
hardly glowing. The Scottish Provident Institution is described as a ‘wilful’ 
and enthusiastic example of ‘would-be modernity’; only the abstracted 
Corbusianism of Craigsbank Church (1964) is favoured with an image.116 
Perhaps ‘style’ was more acceptable in church design. In contrast, RMJM had 
a stronger critical reputation and greater international profile, plus more 
experience of the design of major public buildings. RMJM’s Modernism was 
rigorous in conception and subtle in execution, although it was hardly avant-
garde. Indeed, Matthew was perhaps an even more ‘establishment’ figure 
than Kininmonth. Yet while RAKP’s work arguably failed to reach the heights 
achieved by Kininmonth’s former partner, Basil Spence, whose approach was 
similarly visual, we should be wary of entirely writing it off. Certainly 
RMJM’s proposals were better resolved and more effectively planned than 
those by RAKP, the domes of whose 1971 ‘opera house’ scheme seem less 
than successful. However, RAKP’s elevations compare reasonably well with 
the Scottish Provident building, even if in the case of the theatre there remains 
a sense of Lasdun-esque strata being employed as applied visual dressing 
rather than as part of an integrated composition. If there was a real ‘design’ 
                                                
115 Barnabas Calder, ‘Committees and Concrete: the genesis and architecture of Denys 
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problem at Edinburgh, it related to planning rather than architecture as such. 
From Abercrombie onwards, the location of the new theatre was dictated in 
part by the presence of the Lyceum, which was either to be replaced or would 
form part of a multi-venue cultural complex along with the Usher Hall. 
However, the site was relatively small. Even RMJM’s ingenious attempt to 
borrow the space above the adjacent roads still resulted in a design that 
seemed to overload the site. Mention was occasionally made of constructing 
the theatre opposite the Usher Hall on the other side of Lothian Road, but this 
idea never appealed, partly because it was felt to lack the potential 
advantages in terms of shared backstage and front-of-house facilities that the 
Castle Terrace site would allow.117  
 
Harris’s mention of ‘the procedure which local authorities must follow’ 
touches on a more significant point, and one which perhaps starts to get to the 
root of the matter. The ‘opera house’ was essentially a civic initiative, but to 
what extent was the public purse able to support very big projects? The onus 
was on local Repertory companies to fundraise, and/or local authorities to 
step in, though the latter were limited by the provisions of the Local 
Government Act and the extent to which spending on the arts was considered 
politically expedient. ‘Housing the Arts’, as we have noted, was limited by its 
relatively restricted capital allocations. The significant number of medium-
sized new theatres around Britain which were realised between the 1960s and 
the 1980s testifies that the system worked as far as Repertory theatre in the 
English regions, Scotland, and Wales was concerned. Bigger projects, 
however, were cast into something of a vacuum. The National Theatre was 
successfully completed, but planned opera houses in Manchester and Cardiff, 
proposed at the same time as the Edinburgh project, never came to fruition, 
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and Glasgow’s £20 million cultural centre was truncated, with only the 
concert hall being constructed. Were these big projects just too big for local 
authorities? Alexander Dunbar of the Scottish Arts Council concluded of 
Edinburgh in November 1975 that the creation of a special organisation like 
the South Bank Theatre Board (which had overseen the National Theatre) 
would have been helpful.118  
 
In addition, the extent to which a decision about the funding of the ‘opera 
house’ seemed to be stalled between 1966 and 1971 raises the question of just 
how keen central government really was to support these larger projects. 
Clearly the aim to improve theatre outwith London was genuine, as the slew 
of new theatres around Britain confirms, and some projects which 
successfully claimed national significance, such as the Burrell Collection, were 
eventually funded. However, such significance could be debated: Glasgow’s 
cultural centre proposals, for example, were deemed, perhaps conveniently, 
to be a local project and so not eligible for government funding. Furthermore, 
was a grant promised to Edinburgh only grudgingly? In 1971, the Paymaster 
General advised that the decision to spend large sums improving Covent 
Garden meant that ‘it would be difficult to refuse this offer [to Edinburgh] 
while providing the greater part of finance in London’; making a commitment 
to Edinburgh gave a presentational advantage to the London grant.119 
Meanwhile, proposals to improve Edinburgh’s Playhouse and Glasgow’s 
Theatre Royal were seized on; in the latter case, Scottish Opera was praised 
for having raised so much money itself.120 That the Playhouse could be 
refurbished as a viable large-scale theatre for at least the medium term also 
counted against significant expenditure on a new building. If all Glasgow and 
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Edinburgh wanted was something better than they already had, then 
refurbishment would deliver that.121 Thus with other calls on the public purse 
carrying greater political weight in a period of increasing economic 
turbulence, pragmatism ultimately won out over idealism. In these 
circumstances, the delays occasioned by the lengthy negotiations about 
finance in the late 1960s and by architectural squabbling in the early 1970s, 
neither of which in itself should have been fatal, collided with a system that 
worked well for smaller theatres but made little formal provision for ‘monster 
projects’.  
 
In 1975, a civil servant reflected that 
Probably few of those who have been personally involved in the Castle 
Terrace project over the last 5 years will be anxious to repeat the 
experience, and a project of the Castle Terrace scale will have to wait 
another half generation for new enthusiasms and a better economic 
climate.122 
Indeed, it was to be the 1990s before significant sums of public money were 
once again routinely spent on major arts buildings in Britain. In Edinburgh, 
after proposals for a substantial theatre were briefly resurrected in 1984, the 
‘hole in the ground’ on Castle Terrace was filled in the early nineties by an 
office development that also included new premises for the Traverse Theatre. 
Finally, in 1994, the city’s Empire Theatre re-opened after major 
reconstruction by Law and Dunbar-Nasmith and Theatre Projects Consultants 
as the Edinburgh Festival Theatre, effectively creating the centre first 
proposed by Abercrombie some forty-five years before and bringing a long 
saga to a close. 
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A conversation with Tom Parnell encouraged me to think that an account of 
the ‘opera house’ would be worth writing, and I am grateful to Diane Watters 
and Sally Rush for giving me the opportunity to do so. I am especially pleased 
to have had the opportunity to discuss the project with Brian Annable OBE. I 
would also like to thank Miles Glendinning for commenting on the draft text, 
Dawn Evers and colleagues at Historic Environment Scotland for making 
available (and photographing) uncatalogued RMJM material, the Centre for 
Research Collections at the University of Edinburgh for access to 
uncatalogued Robert Matthew drawings, and Jennifer Hogg at Edinburgh 
City Archives for referring me to uncatalogued papers. Historic Environment 










1. The ‘Opera House’ as proposed by Kininmonth in 1966, viewed from 
the south-east with the hotel tower beyond (Crown Copyright, 
National Records of Scotland, ED61/72) 
2. Kininmonth’s 1968 proposal viewed from the north, coupling terraces 
reminiscent of Denys Lasdun’s National Theatre in London with a 
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strong sense of symmetry and vaguely ‘Art Deco’ vertical feature (© 
The Scotsman Publications Ltd) 
3. Model of RMJM’s 1974 proposal for the ‘opera house’ (RIBA 
Collections) 
4. Section through RMJM’s 1974 proposal: the ‘backward’ stepping of the 
rear wall of the auditorium and the forward-facing ‘slips’ within the 
auditorium betray the influence of John Bury, as both recall the 
Barbican Theatre in London, with the design of which Bury had been 
involved (Historic Environment Scotland (Robert Matthew, Johnson-
Marshall Collection)) 
5. RMJM’s 1975 ‘opera house’ scheme, drawing of the elevation to Castle 
Terrace (Historic Environment Scotland (Robert Matthew, Johnson-
Marshall Collection)) 
6. RMJM’s 1975 scheme, plan including the Usher Hall and Lyceum 
Theatre. Castle Terrace (and the existing multi-storey car park) is to the 
right. A dotted line shows the extent of the building, which would sail 
over the road. (Historic Environment Scotland (Robert Matthew, 
Johnson-Marshall Collection)) 
7. RMJM’s 1975 scheme, section (Historic Environment Scotland (Robert 
Matthew, Johnson-Marshall Collection)) 
 
